Russia’s foreign policy is shaped by domestic factors and the authoritarian nature of its governance. This policy paper discusses the strategies the West needs to respond to the international and domestic wrongdoings already committed by the Kremlin and to deter Moscow’s future aggression.

This working paper takes the case of European policies in support of resilience in the EU’s neighbourhood to explore the potential of a more flexible model of theory-practice engagement based on knowledge exchange rather than transfer.

Does the EU’s new agenda for the southern neighbourhood respond to the demands and practices of the Arab uprisings or does it revert to the stability paradigm? This policy paper argues that the EU could regain relevance in a multipolar region by putting itself more firmly behind citizens and their demands in the region.

There is a tendency in policy and academic circles to characterize state capture as the result of a late-development syndrome and unfair competition. This policy paper argues for the need to critically reflect on the key role of the current neoliberal economic model in sustaining these dynamics.

This working paper capitalizes on EU-LISTCO’s analytical framework to explore the influence of migration and radicalization on risks created by areas of limited statehood and contested orders in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

This working paper discusses the governance of political economy in areas of limited statehood and contested orders by focusing on the issue of state capture.

This working paper capitalizes on EU-LISTCO’s analytical framework to assess the preparedness of the European Union and Member States in addressing situations of limited statehood and contested orders in Mali.

This working paper explores global and diffuse risks and how we should think about their potential to turn into threats that overwhelm societal resilience in areas of limited statehood, precipitating violent conflict and governance breakdown.

How is the idea of EU strategic autonomy used and how does it contrast with that of resilience as envisioned in the Global Strategy? This paper explores and highlights some related unforeseen risks for the EU external action.

Although populist actors can be vocal and conspicuous in aligning with external actors contesting the international liberal order, they rarely go as far as swaying or blocking EU foreign policy decisions and outputs.

This paper examines the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments that the EU mobilises in a resilience-informed external action.

The European Union should engage cautiously with state religious institutions so as to not unintentionally damage their legitimacy in the religious sphere.

The aim of this policy paper is to examine the EU’s conflict management approach to protracted conflicts in its neighbourhood and analyse how the resilience paradigm can mitigate the effects of areas of limited statehood and contested order in the European neighbourhood.

This paper explores the extent to which global and diffuse risks impact the Eastern Partnership countries of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood.

This booklet presents 13 scenarios for governance breakdown and violent conflict in the EU’s neighbourhood which were created in the context of the EU-LISTCO research project.

The EU needs to prioritize the global risks which not only endanger the EU and its surroundings in the long term, but can also act as major spoilers in the short term.

The EU should seek to strengthen societal resilience by supporting democratic reforms in its southern neighborhood. Such support should be guided by local priorities, those that address the economic and well as the political, educational, and health needs of the Arab public.

This report details the unique challenges posed to the external action of the EU and its member states by Mali, a land-locked country in West Africa spanning mountainous, desert, and tropical terrains. But what is the background of the areas of limited statehood and contested orders in the country?

Drawing on EU-LISTCO’s conceptual framework, this paper defines the analytical category of resilience and provides a roadmap to study its characteristics in configurations of areas of limited statehood and contested order.

Libya is a special case within the EU-LISTCO project. It is in the western region of North Africa, bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, Algeria and Tunisia to the west, Chad and Niger to the south, Sudan to the south-east and Egypt to the east. But what is the background of the areas of limited statehood and contested orders in the country?

Ukraine makes for a special case within the EU-LISTCO project. It is the second-largest country in Europe and has the longest land border with the EU. But what is the background of the areas of limited statehood and contested orders in the country?

The EU’s economic and political instruments have become gradually dominated by resilience framings, with an emphasis on multilateralism, adaptation, and long-term and bottom-up responses.

Innovative quantitative approaches can help the EU know about, prepare for, and possibly help prevent governance breakdown and violent conflict in its neighbourhood.

Quantitative forecasting and scenario-based foresight methods can be applied to help prevent governance breakdown and violent conflict in Europe’s neighbourhood.

As part of their efforts to professionalize crisis and conflict prevention, foreign policy-makers are investing more in foresight, early warning or prediction. Different approaches and their products are suited for different purposes, based on distinct strengths and weaknesses.

While occasions of contact between academia and practice exist, they remain mainly ad hoc and superficial. Academics can contribute to policy-making by using their unique skill set but with an eye for the concepts, the framing and the story-telling.

In order to help build resilience, the EU needs to know its neighbours, find the right partners in its neighbourhood, and provide the policy space for new resilience partnerships to develop.

Neither limited statehood nor contested orders will go away. They create vulnerabilities and pose risks, but they do not in themselves amount to threats to the EU. Only if and when areas of limited statehood and contested orders deteriorate into governance breakdowns and violent conflict, do the risks turn into threats to the security and stability of the EU, its member states, and citizens.

Author: David Cadier

Governing populists overprioritize domestic politics, indulge in “undiplomatic” diplomacy, and yield to conspiracy theories. The implications for EU foreign policy cannot be underestimated.